Validator Key Custody

Select practical key protection without weakening operational boundaries.

Validator key custody without an expensive HSM

ROKO operators can get meaningful hardware-assisted protection without a datacenter network HSM. The right device depends on which key is being protected and whether the node can ask the device to sign directly.

Key types are not interchangeable

MaterialNeeded online?Main concern
funding/bonding accountrarelytheft of stake/funds
validator session keyswhile validatingunauthorized consensus actions or downtime
temporal/PTP² keywhile advertisingfalse/unauthorized time announcements
libp2p node identitywhile networkingpeer identity stability/impersonation
disk/credential unlockat boot/service startoffline theft of the keystore

Keep funding/account keys offline or on a transaction-signing hardware wallet whenever the network workflow permits. Session keys and the libp2p identity have different availability and rotation requirements.

Practical protection tiers

OptionWhat it can do wellImportant limit
encrypted software keystore plus offline encrypted backupbaseline confidentiality and recoverykeys are usable in host memory while the node runs
TPM 2.0 plus LUKS/systemd encrypted credentialsbind disk/credential release to measured host statenot automatically a Substrate session signer
FIDO2/YubiKey-class tokenoperator MFA and LUKS/credential unlocka security token is not automatically a direct validator HSM
YubiHSM 2PKCS#11, wrapping, attestation, compatible Ed25519/secp256k1 operationsno documented sr25519; ROKO has no documented PKCS#11 session-signer adapter
Nitrokey HSM 2low-cost PKCS#11 smart-card HSM for supported RSA/ECC schemesno documented sr25519; integration must be implemented and tested
network/cloud HSMcentralized policy, audit, HA at organizational scalecost/latency/vendor integration; optional, not a prerequisite

ROKO/Substrate session keys use more than one cryptographic scheme, including sr25519. Vendor algorithm lists for YubiKey PIV, YubiHSM 2, and Nitrokey HSM 2 do not establish sr25519 support. The current ROKO node uses its software keystore and does not document a PKCS#11 session signer.

Therefore:

  • do not claim that these devices keep every validator session key permanently

inside hardware;

  • use them today for operator authentication, encrypted-volume/credential

unlock, backup wrapping, compatible account keys, and other supported roles;

  • claim direct in-device session signing only after a signer adapter and every

required key scheme pass integration, restart, throughput, failover, and rotation tests.

“Hardware unlocks an encrypted software keystore” is valuable, but it is not the same as “the private signing key never leaves hardware.”

A sensible low-cost design

1. Enable secure boot and a TPM 2.0 when the host supports them. 2. Put chain identities/keystore on encrypted storage. 3. Bind unattended unlock to a reviewed TPM policy, or require a FIDO2 token when attended recovery is acceptable. 4. Keep a second enrolled unlock/recovery method offline and physically separate. 5. Store funding keys on a separate hardware wallet/offline signer. 6. Restrict USB devices with physical controls or allowlisting. A USB port is also an attack surface. 7. Back up encrypted key material and test restoration on an isolated host. 8. Rotate by activating a replacement before retiring the old key.

Never make a single USB device, TPM-bound blob, motherboard, or passphrase the only recovery path.

Secret handling

  • Do not pass seed phrases or node keys as command-line flags.
  • Do not put them in environment variables captured by service managers,

diagnostics, or crash reports.

  • Prefer an interactive prompt, restricted credential file, encrypted systemd

credential, or local signer API.

  • Decrypt only at service start into a root/service-readable runtime location,

not a persistent world-readable file.

  • Disable local unsafe key-management RPC after provisioning.
  • Sanitize support bundles and monitoring labels.

References